

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

REP

USSR

DATE DISTR. 22 Dec 1952

Soviet Army Psychological Warfare Organization and Vulnerabilities

NO. OF PAGES **3**

NO. OF ENCLS.
(LISTED BELOW)

DATE
ACQUIRED BY SOURCE

SUPPLEMENT TO
REPORT NO.

DATE OF INFORMATION

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1.

There are no "Seventh Sections" or other specialized psychological warfare echelons or units in time of peace. Political officers and cadres now conducting troop information activities would convert to psychological warfare activities in time of war. Reserve material now in warehouses for issue in time of war includes loudspeakers and other specialized equipment for this purpose. Printing and broadcasting facilities now under the control of the civilian AGITPROP would doubtless be made available to the Chief Directorate of Propaganda and Agitation in the Ministry of Armed Forces in time of war, and personnel involved could easily be placed under military jurisdiction. In World War II, many of such personnel were placed in uniform.

While there is no psychological warfare center as such, the following Institutes for area study are in operation; (a) Under the Soviet Ministry of Armed Forces, at Leningrad, for Satellite Areas. Selected Soviet political officers have been trained at this Institute, nominally as inspectors and liaison officers, but actually for control purposes. (b) Under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs at Leningrad (Institutes for Asian and for African Affairs), and at Moscow (Institutes for European and for American Affairs).

2.

From 1950 on there has been a new emphasis on political work in the Soviet Army, and a partial reversal of the trend of political commissars in vogue before 1939. Political officers (Zampolits) have been added to the level of companies and batteries. Zampolits are now recruited from officer personnel, and serve as a military reserve. They are picked individuals and have full military competence, which they maintain by participation in officers' training. Where there were three officers per company, there are now four. The company commander has final responsibility for military decisions, but he usually consults the opinion of his Zampolit, who may turn in an adverse report on him through political channels if an independent decision by the commander turns out to be unfavorable. The average company

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commander seems to feel that the Zampolit has a good deal more influence than he has himself. This is a source of tension. It is heightened by the fact that Zampolits are on a separate promotion list, and are advanced by their own political superiors much faster than straight military personnel.

Zampolits have three tasks: (a) To de-westernize Soviet Army personnel who have seen a better life outside the USSR. This is done by pointing out the injustice and exploitation on which Western progress has been built, and asserting that Soviet progress, working more slowly, is on a nobler ideological plane; (b) inculcate a fighting hatred of England and the United States; and (c) to build up the Party and Komsomol membership in each company-sized unit. This program does not mean an overall increase of Communist Party membership, but a redistribution of members.

Zampolits on a company level must assemble Party sponsored meetings twice each month. These are largely hate sessions. These are in addition to the political training periods scheduled in the regular program of a unit. Also outside the regular training periods are unit meetings, of 30-40 minutes each, held three times a week. A typical theme at such a unit meeting would be, "How do United States Soldiers Spend Their Leisure Time?" They would attend cowboy films and get so worked up that they would come out of the theater and kill 8-10 Germans for sport. The regular training program of the Unit contains two official sessions per week of two hours each. These are conducted on the basis of lesson plans from higher headquarters, originating in civilian AGITPROF directives. The unvarying theme is contrast of East and West, to the disparagement of the latter. Repetition, through five-six hours a week, month in and month out, causes 50% of the troops in the Soviet Zone of Germany to accept all or part of the propaganda output. Acceptance varies according to the type of man: (a) The average recruit from the farm has only three-four years of schooling and accepts what he hears. (b) men with 6-10 years of schooling reject a great part. There are not very many of these; and (c) old soldiers who have travelled and seen life believe very little. Up to 90% believe some themes.

At least 40% of the men sleep or doze in lectures. An exception is the type of talks given by regimental Party or Komsomol officers in the evening before groups gathered to view motion picture shows.

There is a great difference between acceptance of international themes and national ones. When propaganda sessions deal with internal affairs, men know that the Party line is false. That is why 50% are doubtful about international themes. A dilemma facing the Soviet Government is its need for specialists with scientific training to further the program of industrialization of the country. As the people become better educated, they are harder to deceive. For this reason, as much as any other, the State is now charging tuition to schools, and cutting down the number of well-educated persons.

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Only if there was stiff resistance, followed by counterattack. Undoubtedly there would be some decomposition of morale during an occupation, but if the Soviet Army soldier.

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After the early time of fresh hatreds, the Soviet people came to feel that German war guilt did not attach to individual German soldiers, but to Nazi leaders and prisoners. The individual soldiers did not appear to be supermen in their status of

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No, but there might be passive non-cooperation. There would be an attitude - Let Stalin Fight. The people would expect nothing of victory. Old soldiers are disillusioned after returning to a life of slavery and seeing the ingratitude of the Soviet Government to the men who had fought so long. They will put doubts in the minds of the young people to a sufficient extent to cause them to slacken if World War III drags out and involves much sacrifice.

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It would be good politics. Too close an analogy should not be drawn to the Vlassov movement in World War II. This movement had little effect on the home-front, from which it was too remote. It had limited effect on the Red Army, Hitler was a recognized foe in 1943. Vlassov was a known servitor of Hitler, and therefore was also an enemy. The existence of a liberation movement inside the USSR would cause doubt as to who was fighting for Russia, the Stalinists or the "liberators".

In the camps are the least dependable elements in the USSR from the Soviet point of view. If the Government recognized a danger from them, they would all be killed by poison, starvation or overwork. However, there is a chance that some of them might be liberated if their camps were attacked by surprise and the guards were given no chance to shoot the inmates.

Many months supply is placed in the camps by the end of September, because transport is often difficult in winter. Central warehouses supply a number of camps apiece.

Yes. It is staffed by retired military personnel on virtually full pay and almost on active duty. On my collective farm in 1950, I sent a number of Komsomol members to the rayon center for marksmanship and military training once a week, two or three times a month. There was no summer camp. At the rayon center the Voenkomat (Draft Board) kept a stock of arms and ammunition. I have seen a full aerodrome, commanded by a colonel, devoted to DOSAAF air training. DOSAAF members are trained in partisan warfare, and could put up a serious fight for or against an invader.

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